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Zur Diskussion – For Discussion 
Agricultural Conservation Measures –  





Academic scrutiny has recently turned on payments 
for environmental services (PES). In the European 
Union (EU), they are embedded in agri-environmental 
programmes, which have been an important com-
ponent of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
ever since its fundamental reform of 1992. Although 
agri-environmental programmes amount to just about 
one-tenth of the EU’s main agricultural expenditures 
(the ‘first pillar’ of the CAP), they do exert substantial 
influence. For instance, during recent years they  
included some 25% of Germany’s agricultural acre-
age. 
The present contribution to the debate on PES fo-
cuses on a subset of EU agri-environmental pro-
grammes which I call agricultural conservation 
measures (ACMs). They aim explicitly at supporting 
nature conservation through the continuation or re-
sumption of traditional land-use practices, such as 
haymaking, low-input pasturage, or low-input crop-
ping along field borders that leaves room for rare 
weeds. Such measures are vital because the outstand-
ing species richness of Europe’s countryside depends 
on traditional land-use methods (HAMPICKE, 2006, 
2013). Other programmes dedicated to issues such as 
erosion or groundwater control will be remarked on in 
passing. 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the academic 
literature on PES. In sections 3 to 6, I describe the 
current situation with regard to ACMs in the EU, dis-
cussing types of ACMs, the related property-rights 
regimes, and questions of incentives and efficiency.  
In section 7, I criticize the design of ACMs from  
a welfare-economic point of view and discuss to what 
extent the ensuing recommendations can be translat- 
ed into real policies. Section 8 offers conclusions  
and economic suggestions for further development, 
which are supplemented by ethical considerations in 
section 9. 
2 Academic Literature on  
Payments for Environmental 
Services   
The academic discussion on payments for environ-
mental services (PES) typically takes one of two dif-
ferent approaches. The first approach focuses on the 
design and implementation of PES from a practical 
down-to-earth point of view. With regard to European 
agri-environmental programmes, their success is ques-
tioned (see, for example MARGGRAF, 2003; KLEIJN 
and SUTHERLAND, 2003). The second approach dis-
cusses PES at a more abstract and general level in line 
with the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 
2005).  
One point of contention in the more abstract  
debate is the question whether PES can be described 
as a market-based instrument (VAN HECKEN and 
BASTIAENSEN, 2010; VATN, 2010) or ought rather to 
be understood as a Coasian approach (MURADIAN  
et al., 2010; TACCONI, 2012). Some authors are  
concerned with the commodification involved in PES, 
i.e. the reduction of fundamental life-supporting natu-
ral systems to tradeable items (VAN HECKEN and 
BASTIAENSEN, 2010; NORGAARD, 2010). They hold 
that this reduction is inadequate, given the complexity 
of ecological systems. Equity and distribution, as well 
as the role PES plays in income generation and pov-
erty reduction are common features in most of this 
literature, since many practical examples of PES are 
found in developing countries (ENGEL et al., 2008; 
VAN HECKEN and BASTIAENSEN, 2010; ZABEL and 
ROE, 2009; MURADIAN et al., 2010; PASCUAL et al., 
2010). Likewise, many authors discuss the role of 
property rights, which seem to be fundamental for the 
success of PES (LASCHEWSKI and PENKER, 2009). 
Of special interest for the following discussion is 
the distinction between input-based and output-based 
payments (ENGEL et al., 2008) – or, in ZABEL and 
ROE’S (2009) terms – performance payments. While 
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input-oriented payments reward land users who com-
ply with certain rules of action (e.g. do not use pesti-
cides), output-oriented payments reward those who 
demonstrate the desired results (e.g. a population of an 
endangered species on their land). Output-oriented 
payments have various advantages, although problems 
of information asymmetry, incentive, and risk need to 
be addressed (cf. ZABEL and ROE, 2009; MURADIAN 
et al., 2010; DERISSEN and QUAAS, 2013). 
3  Types of Agricultural  
Conservation Measures (ACMs) 
A typical input-based, agricultural conservation meas-
ure (ACM) is outlined in Table 1. Although “input-
based” might not be the best possible term for every 
item in the Table, it categorizes the type of instru-
ments reasonably well. Its principal component is a 
set of rules of action. If a participating farm complies 
with these rules, it is rewarded with a payment. The 
payment is based on the average costs and receipts of 
the process, and its purpose is to indemnify participat-
ing farms for the losses they incur by following the 
rules. Regular inspections are carried out in a sample 
of all participating farms. A large number of input-
oriented ACMs are operating in EU member coun-
tries, co-financed by the EU. 
A second, much less common model of ACM 
rewards the delivery of defined ‘ecological goods’. 
For instance, in a programme in the German state of 
Baden-Württemberg, participating farms receive € 50 
per hectare per year if they can demonstrate at least 
four species of flowers, out of a catalogue of 28, to 
grow in their grassland (MELRBW 1999). A similar 
but more refined programme is operating in Switzer-
land (OPPERMANN and GUJER, 2003; GUJER, 2005, 
2006). Output-oriented ACMs appear preferable as 
they target results and should therefore be implement-
ed more widely (GEROWITT et al., 2003). However, 
this result hinges on some underlying issues that I will 
address in the following sections. 
4  Property Rights 
According to new institutional economics, property 
rests upon an agreement among citizens (OSTROM, 
1990; OSTROM and SCHLAGER, 1995; BROMLEY, 
1997). Someone granted a property is, in other words, 
given the right to dispose of an asset, although this 
right may be restricted. Only the dominium type of 
property rights gives the owner unlimited power of 
disposal; the owner may even destroy the asset. In 
contrast, if property is granted as a patrimonium, the 
owner is free to utilize the asset (usus and usus fruc-
tus) but must not damage or destroy it (abusus).  
In practice, there are countless fine-graded vari-
ants of dominium and patrimonium. Specifically, 
property rights in the European countryside are not 
always explicit and clear, but rather implicit and open 
to interpretation. For instance, Article 14(2) of the 
German Constitution demands that private property be 
used in a way that promotes the public well being, but 
it is not immediately clear what this means for a 
farmer. Moreover, property rights are not stipulated 
once and forever – rather, the bundle of rights granted 
to a specific owner may change with time. Something 
that used to be a dominium may be turned into a  
patrimonium by a change in law or regulations.  
For example, there seems to be a 
growing implicit agreement in the EU 
that soil and water resources ought to 
be regarded as a patrimonium. Over 
time rules and regulations define what 
becomes part of ‘good agricultural 
practice’ – the accepted professional 
standard among farmers. Once farm-
ers demand payments for treating soil 
and water properly we are on a slip-
pery slope that parallels motorists 
who demand payments for stopping at 
the red light. Just as we do not pay 
the motorists, so the argument goes, 
we should not pay the farmers. Not-
withstanding this concern, a large num- 
ber of agro-environmental schemes still 
Table 1.  Example of an input-oriented Agricultural  
Conservation Measure 
Programme: Grassland Management Conducive to Nature Conservation 
Financing: European Union 75%, State Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany 25% 
Reward:  € 205 per hectare per year 
Term:  five years 
Obligations:  
- no mineral fertilizing 
- no organic manuring 
- no sewage sludge manuring 
- no pesticide spraying 
- no maintenance works (rolling, levelling) between 1 April and 31 May  
- no usage (mowing, pasturage) between 1 December and 30 April 
- stocking capacity not exceeding 1,7 large animal units 
- no irrigation, no drainage 
- toleration of temporary waterlogging 
Source: Directive of January 29, 2003. AMTSBLATT (Official Gazette) MECKLENBURG-
VORPOMMERN (2003): 113 
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offer payments for erosion control, reduction of nitro-
gen pollution, and other restrictions. This may reflect 
the ongoing ‘revalorisation of rural property objects’, 
as discussed in detail by LASCHEWSKI and PENKER 
(2009). However, I will not dwell further on these 
delicate questions here. 
In contrast to soil and water, the plant diversity 
in rural fields, meadows, and pastures is still regarded 
as a dominium, the only exception being woody 
structures interspersed in farmland. Outside protected 
areas, farmers are free to intensify cultivation to the 
point that all flowers in the grassland and all weeds in 
the crop land are eliminated – as long as they respect 
water and soil integrity and use only admissible means 
(specified in terms of permitted herbicides, dosage, 
machinery, and timing). Farmers may freely choose 
to participate in a programme for, say, weed protec-
tion. In this situation, it is fully legitimate for those 
who do participate to ask for payment. Their demand 
would cease to be legitimate as soon as property rights 
were defined so that weeds had to be tolerated on 
farmland, turning them, too, from a dominium into a 
patrimonium. 
Many practitioners would protest the last remark 
because they regard the current property-rights regime 
as self-evident, as a necessary result of physical facts. 
This is a misconception. The rules of a society can 
and do change along with the prevailing value judge-
ments they express. Society is in principle free to  
redefine property rights – although with regard to  
their consequences, some regimes may be better than 
others. 
Along this line of reasoning, some authors (e.g. 
VAN HECKEN and BASTIAENSEN, 2010) have doubted 
the legitimacy of vesting property rights in land users 
so that they are entitled to receive PES. Such doubts 
appear justified in many cases. However, with regard 
to ACMs in Central Europe, the current arrangement 
is in fact legitimate, for three reasons.  
(1)  ACMs contribute to the fair distribution of con-
servation costs. Throughout Central Europe, farm-
ers constitute only a small fraction of the total 
population (in Germany 3%). Non-farmers, i.e. 
the overwhelming majority, are just as responsi-
ble for the preservation of biodiversity as are 
farmers. ACMs spread conservation costs over 
the whole population rather than imposing them 
on a small minority. As a result, the cost per con-
tributor is reduced to a trifle. 
(2)  For individual farms, maintenance of traditional 
land-use systems is prohibitively costly; Table 2 
gives a typical example. To demand such efforts 
without adequate payments would be to drive 
many farmers into bankruptcy. 
(3)  ‘PES are never established in an institutional 
vacuum’ (VATN, 2010: 1247). Suppose that, for 
the past 200 years, farmers had been granted their 
property as a patrimonium subject to the duty of 
preserving biodiversity. Then, many mechanical 
and chemical implements of modern agriculture 
would never have been widely applied. Species 
living in fields, meadows, and pastures would not 
be endangered today, but food would be much 
more expensive. Perhaps the conventional agri-
culture of this alternative history would resemble 
the organic agriculture as we know it. But of 
course, history has taken a different course, and 
to ignore it, in a context that is as strongly path-
dependent as social arrangements, would be to 
ask for unnecessary trouble. Against this back-
ground, paying farmers for nature protection, e.g. 
through ACMs, seems to be a wise policy.  
5  Incentives  
Some farmers cooperate in ACMs out of their person-
al environmental convictions, but financial reasons are 
believed to be most important. In other words, they 
follow incentives. It is, however, important to distin-
guish between the incentive to participate and the 
incentive to meet a policy objective like increased 
biodiversity. 
5.1  Incentives to Participate 
The effectiveness of any supposed incentive depends 
on how the costs and benefits of participation in an 
Table 2. Cost calculation of suckler cow keeping 
with high value for biodiversity 
 €/ha. yr 
Variable costs (restocking, feed concentrate,  
- mineral feed, stud fee, veterinarian and  
- medicines, insurance, energy, water, fuel, 
- bedding, others, interest on working capital 
300,00 
Summer and winter fodder costs 367,12 
Labour costs 115,00 
Fixed costs 42,88 
Total costs 825,00 
Market performance 351,51 
Deficit 473,49 
Source and more details on suckler cows: RÜHS and HAMPICKE 
(2010): 356  
More calculations on land-use conducive to nature conservation in 
HAMPICKE (2013), GEISBAUER and HAMPICKE (2012). 
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ACM compare to those of alternative courses of  
action. This is illustrated by two common cases.  
(1)  In agriculturally low-productive regions, e.g. in 
hilly or sandy country, common practice (like 
low stocking rates in grassland farming) already 
resembles what is demanded by input-oriented 
ACMs. Hence, farmers willingly cooperate to  
secure their income. 
(2)  In high-productive regions, the ACM payments 
are unattractive as farmers earn more by conven-
tional high-input cropping. Consequently, they 
have little interest to accept such contracts, regis-
tering only the odd low-productive plot in the 
programmes. 
5.2  Incentives to Achieve Success  
Both input- and output-oriented ACMs offer incen-
tives to participate, but only output-oriented ACMs 
offer an incentive for participating farmers to achieve 
an ecological success. 
Farmers in input-oriented programmes some-
times frankly admit that they do not care about the 
success. Their attitude towards their ecological output 
thus stands in striking contrast to the high quality 
standards applied today to agricultural commodities. 
All that these farmers do is to execute instructions 
(see Table 1) to avoid sanctions. Given this lamenta-
ble state of affairs, the ecological success of input-
oriented ACMs depends strictly and entirely on the 
design of the instructions. 
Output-oriented ACMs differ in this respect  
by design. Because participants receive payments only 
if they can demonstrate the contractually agreed out-
put, e.g. if certain plant species are present in a mead-
ow, they are forced to take a direct interest in the  
success of their efforts. There are also important  
secondary effects, as observed in recent programmes  
(OPPERMANN and GUJER, 2003). Farmers who wish to 
participate need to acquire (often, reacquire) the abil-
ity to identify wild plant species and learn about their 
ecological needs to understand and adhere to the per-
formance criteria of the ACM. This engagement 
changes farmers’ valuations. They no longer regard 
meadow flowers as useless or unwanted but appreci-
ate them as valuable. In recent years, competitions for 
the title of the region’s most beautiful meadow have 
been organized in parts of Germany – events that, one 
or two decades earlier, would have been ridiculed by 
farmers. 
6  Efficiency 
Three types of ‘efficiency’ need to be distinguished: 
physical effectiveness, fiscal efficiency, and efficien-
cy in welfare-economic or benefit-cost terms. 
6.1  Physical Effectiveness 
It is true that, given how much money has been spent 
on ACMs since 1992, their scholarly evaluation has 
been deficient (MARGGRAF, 2003). Among the exist-
ing studies, a number attempt to evaluate the physical 
effectiveness of input-oriented ACMs, covering most 
of the actual programmes. Some studies directly com-
pare the performances of participating and non-
participating farms (FEEHAN et al., 2005), others 
compile such evaluations, in many cases justly com-
plaining of a lack of methodological rigour (KLEIJN 
and SUTHERLAND, 2003). The conclusions are mixed. 
Studies that describe input-oriented programmes as an 
unequivocal success (SCHUMACHER, 2007) are the 
exception. Rather, it seems that there have been fail-
ures as well as successes, and success seems to de-
pend on the existence of a set of favourable factors, 
including the continuity of measures over decades and 
the presence of key persons who have both ecological 
expertise and the farmers’ respect and trust. 
In earlier years, complications arose from the fact 
that agri-environmental measures under EU Regula-
tion 2078/1992 had three quite different objectives: 
nature conservation, market stabilization, and income 
aid. The authorities who designed specific programmes 
often focussed on the second and third objectives. As 
a result, not only was ecological output poor, but ad-
vocates of free trade who opposed any kind of subsi-
dies also had an opportunity to denounce agri-
environmental measures as plain old subsidies in a 
green disguise. They were not altogether wrong.  
EU Regulation 1257/1999 put an end to this prac-
tice. Ever since, the objectives of market stabilization 
and income aid have been pursued through other in-
struments. This has allowed agri-environmental pro-
grammes to focus exclusively on ecological objec-
tives. Therefore, the aspects of income generation and 
poverty reduction, much discussed in the international 
literature on PES (see section 2, above), are irrelevant 
for ACMs in Central Europe.  
The physical effectiveness of ACMs is difficult 
to evaluate, and authors who are less familiar with 
ecological details tend to underestimate these methodo-
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logical problems. One problem is the diversity of spe-
cific objectives. Even though ACMs now have an 
exclusively ecological purpose, different programmes 
serve different ecological objectives: They may aim  
to preserve, safeguard, and foster existing items of 
ecological value, e.g. populations of rare plant species. 
Or they may aim to reestablish such items. Ecologists 
recommend that priority be given to stopping the loss 
of biodiversity and preserving such items of ecolo-
gical value as remain, because such remnants are  
extremely valuable as starting points for future re-
enhancement. Another problem is that it is usually 
very difficult to prove that an ACM has preserved 
what would otherwise have been lost. In general, 
however, one might argue that ACMs have at least 
curbed further losses. 
As for the re-establishment of certain species, 
ecologists are not surprised that the record has been 
unimpressive so far. The reason is time. Weeds do 
reappear promptly when herbicide spraying is aban-
doned, as long as the seed bank in the soil is active 
(LITTERSKI et al., 2005). Depending on their mobility, 
some animals may also reappear soon. But examples 
of slow recovery are much more common, especially 
among plants. Numerous experiments have demon-
strated that the reappearance of plant species dis-
placed from meadows and pasturages takes many 
years (BRIEMLE et al., 1991), often longer than most 
ACMs have been operating. In this context, it is rarely 
sufficiently appreciated that age is a fundamental 
quality feature of ecological structures.  
In contrast to input-oriented payments, output-
oriented ones are physically effective by definition, 
because payments are made only upon demonstration 
of the desired physical result.  
6.2 Fiscal Efficiency 
The aim of fiscal efficiency is to spend as little money 
as possible for a given good, and this is a very press-
ing public concern for obvious reasons. Public author-
ities, therefore, seek the cheapest way to obtain eco-
logical services. 
Economists have suggested that conservation 
contracts be auctioned (LATACZ-LOHMANN and VAN 
DER HAMSVOORT, 1997) to whoever offers to fulfil 
them at the least cost. In theory, it is true that competi-
tion improves both fiscal and overall economic effi-
ciency. While there are very few practical examples to 
judge from, I suspect, for several reasons, that the 
theoretical advantages of open competition may fade 
away in practice (for a discussion on this see CONNOR 
et al., 2008). For one, economists tend to underesti-
mate how much intricate knowledge and experience it 
requires from a land user to meet a well-defined eco-
logical objective. With few exceptions, when the con-
tract may be awarded either to a cattle breeder who 
has both known his pasturage for decades and been 
personally engaged in conservation or to some firm 
unfamiliar with the site, the prudent choice in terms of 
success will be the local farmer, even if the firm 
makes the cheaper offer. 
Among practitioners, the debate on fiscal effi-
ciency focuses on two questions. For one, should 
farmers receive incentive payments, i.e. payments in 
addition to the reimbursement of extra costs or for-
gone receipts? EU Regulations 2078 and 1257 once 
granted supplements of up to 20% of the true costs. 
Following demands by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO, 1994), much to the relief of treasurers, sup-
plements were abandoned in 2005 (EU Regulation 
1698). Unfortunately, this short-term increase of fiscal 
efficiency will likely prove very costly in the long run. 
From an economic point of view, the most fundamen-
tal cause of the lack of conservation in rural areas, i.e. 
of catastrophic losses of biodiversity, is the lack of 
adequate incentives. For decades, the economic setup 
has incited farmers not to conserve. On the other 
hand, if conservation paid, it would be carried out just 
like any other business. It is thus extremely unfortu-
nate that the last, small financial incentive has been 
eliminated from ACMs.  
Another very contentious problem is windfall 
profits. From the treasurys’ point of view, payments 
are a waste of money if they reward farmers for eco-
logical services that they would have provided any-
way, for free. If, for instance, upland farmers have no 
intention of increasing fertilizer and pesticide input, 
why should the government pay them? The problem is 
aggravated by the fact that the conservation of exist-
ing items of ecological value takes priority over resto-
ration. Yet, the very existence of valuable farmland 
biotopes results from their past and continuous rela-
tively conservation-friendly management, and some-
times there is indeed little reason to believe that this 
will change. Nevertheless, I think that farmers who 
have voluntary undertaken such measures should be 
rewarded, for efficiency and fairness reasons. 
6.3 Efficiency in a Welfare Economics 
Framework 
The problems of incentives and windfall profits, and 
indeed of ACM efficiency as a whole, are best addressed 
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in the framework of welfare economics and benefit-
cost analysis. Unfortunately, the literature on PES 
generally argues in terms of public expenditures, rely-
ing on principal-agent or labour economics, or other 
approaches (e.g. ENGEL et al., 2008; ZABEL and ROE, 
2009). The solutions offered are thus invariably sec-
ond-best ones that fail to maximize overall social wel-
fare. The relevant task, however, is not to please the 
treasurer but optimally to allocate society’s resources. 
Leaving aside ethical aspects (see section 9), a 
social optimum implies that all goods and services are 
supplied according to individual demands and that 
prices everywhere equal marginal costs (KOOPMANS, 
1957). A perfect market for private goods automati-
cally approximates this equilibrium. In contrast, the 
optimal allocation of public goods requires that  
the sum of individual bids (Lindahl prices) equals 
marginal costs (Lindahl equilibrium, CORNES and 
SANDLER, 1986). Unlike in the private-good market, 
there is no ‘gravity’ pulling the economic system as a 
whole towards a Lindahl equilibrium. To the contrary, 
information constraints, the possibility of free riding, 
and other circumstances provoke an under supply of 
public goods, so that collective institutions are neces-
sary to correct market dynamics. 
Let us start with the simplifying assumption that 
rural conservation is a perfect public good. In this 
model world, a perfectly informed and benevolent 
utilitarian planner (the state) ascertains how each and 
every citizen values the good in question. All indi- 
vidual demand curves are vertically aggregated into  
a societal demand curve, which is passed on to the 
suppliers of the public good. Every potential supplier, 
depending on their individual situation, then decides 
whether or not to supply a share of the good, and  
how much. For farms, commodities and conservation 
are typically rival goods; more commodities mean  
less conservation, and vice versa. Each farm allocates 
its factors so that their marginal product is the same  
in both commodity and conservation production  
(HAMPICKE, 2006), achieving an optimal mix of 
commodities and conservation. Still in the model 
world, consumers ‘buy’ conservation at Lindahl  
prices, receiving consumer surpluses just as they do 
on the commodity market. Producers, too, supply at 
marginal costs and receive producer surpluses  
(Ricardian rents) in both sectors. In other words, ac-
cording to theory, a so-called ‘windfall profit’ from 
ACMs is nothing but a producer rent. Farmers in an 
ACM who produce conservation at little or no cost 
receive exactly the same kind of rent as farmers who 
happen to own good land that enables them to grow 
grain at low cost, but who sell their grain for the same 
market price as less lucky farmers (cf. RICARDO, 
1817). 
This is the optimum ideally achieved by the 
‘government-assisted invisible hand’ (WELLISZ, 1964). 
Though based on abstract reasoning, it is a relevant 
result. In the realm of private goods, the market equi-
librium, despite its abstractness, is the unchallenged 
prototype of societal organization, and many concrete 
economic policies are based on market metaphors. 
Likewise, the pure theory of public goods should 
serve as prototype of societal organization where public 
goods are concerned. 
Theory needs to make certain important conces-
sions to the empirical world. For instance, the assets 
involved in conservation are rarely pure public goods 
in SAMUELSON’S (1954) sense. They are often mutu-
ally exclusive, or complements rather than substitutes. 
Conservation is not the production of one homoge-
neous good. Therefore, competition between produc-
ers is not perfect; it is easy to find ‘monopolists’, e.g. 
the owner of the only meadow containing a rare plant. 
Conservation efforts are directed at entire ecosystems 
rather than at single organisms or populations, and are 
strongly restricted by irreversibilities and spatial con-
siderations (RANDALL, 2007).  
7  Theoretically Correct ACMs  
In a welfare-economic framework, farmers are not 
‘indemnified’ for losses they incur by caring for bio-
diversity. Rather, farmers sell ecological services just 
as they would sell any other good and are paid market 
prices.  
7.1  Supply 
From a welfare-economic point of view, suppliers of 
ecological services should behave as closely as possi-
ble to how they would in a competitive market. A 
perfect market is an example of unintentional and 
domination-free self-organization. All participants are 
free to choose whatever alternative they prefer, but 
they are unable to deliberately influence data, espe-
cially prices. All they can do is optimally to adapt to 
circumstances. The result is a pattern of consumer and 
producer surpluses that emerges spontaneously and 
thus reflects no single actor’s intentions or power. 
This ‘objectivity’ of the market is the reason that prices 
are accepted by all participants and that rent distribu-
tion goes undisputed. 
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But in the realm of public goods, the dynamics of 
the free market may lead to inefficient non-cooperative 
outcomes like the Nash equilibrium. Cooperation is 
thus called for; individual demands are bundled into 
collective demands; and collectives exert power over 
the market. Accordingly, suppliers of ecological ser-
vices, including farmers in ACMs, do not face an 
anonymous mass of individually powerless buyers, 
but rather a set of powerful institutions.  
On the other hand, the nature of the ecological 
‘goods’ also gives unusual power to the suppliers. 
Instead of a multitude of suppliers offering the same 
good, or very similar goods, (a situation where an 
auction would make sense) there is typically a small 
number of suppliers who control non-substitutable 
goods. Interestingly, this type of monopoly is quite 
distinct from the textbook monopoly based on market 
power or the ‘natural’ monopoly based on technical 
effectiveness, and it would have been inconceivable  
in the world of ecological plenty that still existed  
100 years ago. The main reason why today’s land 
users hold a monopoly on ecological services is the 
extreme scarcity of biodiversity in vast regions of 
Europe. 
Thus, suppliers on the market for ecological ser-
vices are in a similar position as suppliers on the art 
market, where public agents buy pieces of art for mu-
seums. Fortunately, the quality of ecological goods 
can be determined more objectively than the quality of 
art, e.g. using Red Lists. 
Given that both sellers and buyers have unusual 
power, it is futile to hope that a perfectly competitive 
market for ecological goods could be established. In 
particular, any market that could be established lacks 
an automatism to determine the distribution of rents, 
which will therefore remain contentious. But within 
these restrictions, there is ample room to bring the 
current ACMs in the EU closer to the socially optimal 
situation described by welfare economics.  
7.2  Demand 
In a very important paper, RANDALL (2007) outlines  
a consistent valuation and pricing framework for  
non-commodity outputs. He argues that the value of 
ecological services should be determined by the eco-
nomic sovereign, the people. That implies that the 
public at large should decide what share of their re-
sources they want to spend on various forms of con-
servation. State authorities only serve the purpose of 
creating suitable institutions to bundle individual bids. 
(An important qualification to this principle is ex-
plained in section 9, below.) This view stands in stark 
contrast to the present practice in the EU. 
How can we know how much people want to 
spend on conservation? Methods to assess people’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for collective goods have 
been applied to conservation and landscaping for sev-
eral decades. The Contingent Valuation Method, the 
Travel Cost Method, and others have been used to cap-
ture valuations of individual species, ecosystems, and 
landscapes (for a recent overview see MADUREIRA et 
al., 2007; for early examples see NAVRUD, 1992). 
Meta-analysis and benefit transfer studies have been 
added to the field more recently (ELSASSER, 2001; 
NAVRUD and READY, 2007). They aim to transfer 
results between similar cases in a methodologically 
correct way, because it is impossible to conduct valua-
tion studies for every single ecological asset. In gen-
eral, methodological progress, particularly in statistics 
and econometrics, has improved the validity and  
reliability of valuation studies (for overviews see 
BATEMAN and WILLIS, 1999; BATEMAN et al., 2002; 
CHAMP et al., 2003). The perfect measurement of 
valuations to allow for the construction of a Lindahl 
equilibrium will remain an utopian goal. But for the 
purposes of this contribution, I assume that the accu-
mulated knowledge on what people are prepared to 
pay for ecological services, especially for conserva-
tion, provides a useful first approximation. 
In contrast, researchers have clearly neglected  
the question how the results of valuation studies can 
be put to good use in economic and environmental 
policy (HAMPICKE, 2003). Assume that a contingent 
valuation study provides reasonably reliable infor-
mation on how much a sample of the population  
is willing to pay for different amounts of some eco-
logical item. Assume also that correct means, vari-
ances, and other moments have been calculated and 
that we are able to make confident inferences from  
the sample to the parent population. Now, what do we 
do with these data? Asking people to donate the 
amount they claim to be willing to pay would invite 
free riding. Imposing a tax at the height of the mean 
WTP would be tantamount to imposing state-
controlled commodity prices. Both options also suffer 
from the flaw that they aim to skim off the entire 
WTP, while in a competitive market, a consumer sur-
plus remains. But establishing a market for ecological 
services with individual (non-institutional) buyers and 
sellers is close to impossible. As a consequence, the 
original motive of letting the people determine the 
prices is lost along the way. One way out of this prob-
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lem is to use uniform price procurement auctions (see 
ROMSTAD, 2008).  
8  Economic Recommendations  
Not surprisingly, the previous section has shown that 
designing ACMs in strict accordance with the princi-
ples of welfare economics is impractical. Still, prac-
tice can be substantially improved by approximating 
theoretical standards. It is, therefore, very unfortunate 
that the EU Commission does not endorse output-
orientied ACMs, and recent proposals for future agri-
cultural policy suggest that this view is not likely to 
change soon (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2011). Never-
theless, I submit three contrary policy recommenda-
tions: 
(1)  Priority should be given to output-oriented ACMs. 
(2)  Suppliers of ecological services should enjoy 
producer surpluses. 
(3)  People’s preferences should determine the values 
of ecological services. 
The last recommendation is subject to an important 
qualification as discussed in chapter 9. I now add 
some details to each of my recommendations. 
(ad 1) Table 3 summarizes the advantages of out-
put-oriented ACMs, based partly on theory and partly 
on experience. The most important advantages of 
output-orientation are that land users take a genuine 
interest in the success of their conservation efforts, 
they can choose the best and cheapest ‘production’ 
method, and their spirit of innovation is incited.  
As noted in section 2, several authors warn of the 
risks inherent in output-oriented PES. For instance, it 
may take many years for a rare flower species to reap-
pear on a given site following a switch of manage-
ment methods, and there is a risk that it may not ap-
pear at all. Can farmers be expected to incur substan-
tial costs year after year in the hope of a distant and 
uncertain reward? Future research should be directed 
at using output-oriented ACMs to restore valuable 
ecological structures, and in particular at the question 
how the risks can be shared fairly between suppliers 
and buyers. Information asymmetries to the disad-
vantage of buyers, though an important theoretical 
topic, are not a matter of practical concern in ACMs. 
The authorities are usually no less informed about 
ecologically valuable biotopes than land users are, if 
only because biotopes have to be registered under  
EU Directive 92/43/EEC (Habitat Directive).  
(ad 2) Producer surpluses, or Ricardian rents, are 
accepted as a common and legitimate feature of any 
market. In fact, they are the most powerful incentive 
for the supply of commodities and services, for inno-
vation, and thus for the reduction of scarcity. If con-
servation pays, it will be supplied. If orchid meadows 
generate sufficient income, they will not be converted 
into high-input production areas, but rather the re-
verse. And as more biotopes are restored, their scar- 
city, the owners’ monopoly power, and producer rents 
will decrease. While these rents must always remain a 
matter of debate, there are comparable imperfect mar-
kets, e.g. the art market, where the same problem ap-
pears to have been settled more or less satisfactorily. 
Table 3.  Comparison of input and output oriented Agricultural Conservation Measures 
 Input-oriented ACMs Output-oriented ACMs 
Incentive to contribute to 
success of measure 
not extant, payment is subject to compliance EP perfect, payment is subject to success P
Incentive to become informed 
on conservation matters 
not extant or weak EP high, at least target species must be known EP
Physical effectivity dependent on design of programme, often weak E perfect, payment is subject to success P
Versatility not extant P high, farm is able to choose best suited measure 
to achieve success P 
Incentive to cooperate not extant P extant when success is achieved only upon 
combined effort of several farms P 
Control of compliance easy to difficult E easy if easily identifiable target species are 
chosen E 
Nearness to market principles poor, payment is regarded as indemnification, 
bureaucratic way of thinking prevails E 
high, payment is regarded as remuneration for 
valuable service just as any other EP 
Compatibility to free trade measures are prone to degenerate into ordinary 
income subsidies E 
high in theory but not yet agreed by authorities, 
especially WTO 
E: judgement based on empirical experience, see OPPERMAN and GUJER (2003)  
P: judgement based on plausibility and theoretical prediction 
Source: own presentation 
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Unfortunately, both the WTO and the EU reject 
producer surpluses from ACMs. Agricultural ‘subsi-
dies’ in return for conservation are admissible only if 
they do not provide extra income beyond the costs 
(WTO, 1994, EU Regulation 1698). In my view, it is 
curious that economic agents should have the right to 
earn money everywhere except in the business of na-
ture conservation. Governments accept as a matter of 
course that suppliers earn fantastic surpluses even on 
low-competition markets, while even modest surplus-
es generated from public demand are prone to elimi-
nation for fiscal discipline and other reasons. Of 
course, public funds should not be wasted, but modest 
producer rents are no wastage if they serve as incen-
tives for the provision of important services. The me-
ticulous skimming of producer rents in ACMs is im-
plausible especially when subsidies ten times their 
size are being meted out in the ‘first pillar’ of the 
CAP, without any justification, but with the blessing 
of the WTO. As long as financial incentives are 
stripped from ACMs, their success will be severely 
restricted, to the disadvantage of biodiversity conser-
vation. 
(ad 3) The value of ACM output should be de-
termined, not by the ‘whims’ of governments, but 
through state-of-the-art assessment of people’s valua-
tions. We need to develop a framework of ‘green pric-
es’ for ‘green outputs’, based on individual valuations 
and marginal production costs (RANDALL, 2007: 22). 
‘Individuals’ preferences are to count’ (SAMUELSON, 
1975: 223). 
RANDALL (2007) is open about the difficulties 
that inhere in such a scheme. But they might be great-
er than he supposes. While my two previous recom-
mendations could easily be implemented if only poli-
cy makers acknowledged certain economic insights, 
the implementation of a green pricing framework still 
requires substantial theoretical and empirical research. 
How to value ecological services in a genuinely eco-
nomic way and independently of their production 
costs is an unresolved problem. In the few existing 
output-oriented ACM programmes, especially in 
Switzerland, ‘green prices’ are fixed pragmatically 
and certainly in view of the total available funds.  
9  A Side-Glance on Ethics and 
Economic Conclusions 
Economic thought is currently dominated by norma-
tive individualism which urges us to respect individu-
al preferences, and this is indeed an important princi-
ple. Another important principle is intergenerational 
justice, a fundamental component of sustainability. 
Consequently, many agree that the world we hand 
over to future generations should not be impoverished. 
Thus, the preservation of biodiversity is not only an 
instrument for utility maximization in the sense of 
satisfying individuals’ preferences, but also a matter 
of duty. 
In this paper, I have focussed on the economic is-
sues related to ACMs. As a result, a treatment of eth-
ics in similar depth is ruled out, given limited space. 
Yet, circumventing ethics altogether is impossible in 
an epoch when intergenerational justice has become a 
commitment in Constitutions and International Con-
ventions. Therefore, one aspect of conservation ethics 
must be presented in highly condensed form. I do not 
discuss why nature should be conserved. Rather, I take 
this for granted and show the economic consequences 
of such a value judgement. One is that the third rec-
ommendation in the previous section (individual valu-
ation) which at first sight appears to pose the greatest 
difficulties loses some of its delicacy in practice, as 
shown below.  
In Figure 1, G is the commodity output of the 
countryside and N is the conservation ‘output’, or the 
quality of biodiversity. All possible combinations of 
G/N that exhaust production resources are given by 
the transformation curve T. Experts may decide that, 
to the best of their knowledge, N* is the minimal level 
of biodiversity quality that guarantees sustainability. 
Thus, on the principle of intergenerational justice, we 
have a duty to warrant N* independently of individual 
preferences. This is the ‘Safe Minimum Standard’ 
SMS, introduced 60 years ago by resource economist 
CIRIACY-WANTRUP (1952). Not satisfying SMS is an 
option only in case when the costs of doing so are 
unbearable (BISHOP, 1980: 210). 
Depending on the goods and on the characteris-
tics of a given society, different policies are called for 
to respect the Safe Minimum Standard. A society 
characterized by the community indifference curve 
(CIC) I1 fulfils its intergenerational duty while simul-
taneously maximizing its own utility under constraint 
T (for the CIC see MISHAN, 1981). The tangent point 
of T and I1 being the optimal allocation, individual 
preferences need not be corrected by collective poli-
cies, either because preferences, although egotistic, 
unintentionally safeguard N* or because they are par-
tially altruistic. This is not a merely theoretical possi-
bility. In fact, interviewees in contingent valuation 
studies often state that they are willing to pay for  
nature conservation both because they enjoy nature 
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(egotistic preference) and because they feel a duty to 
contribute to its protection (altruistic preference). 
In contrast, a society characterized by the com-
munity indifference curve I2 will fail to steer clear of 
the Safe Minimum Standard if it relies only on indi-
viduals’ preference-based behaviour. Duty requires it 
to adopt corrective policies that exchange Δ N for Δ 
G, lowering the utility level to I2’. This is not at all 
unusual. Important environmental problems are rou-
tinely addressed by collective decisions, such as the 
policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate 
climate change. 
Put in the language of mathematical optimization, 
society faces the problem of maximizing its welfare 
under the constraint to warrant N*. The Lagrange 
multiplier λ is associated to this constraint and repre-
sents the shadow price of conservation. If willingness 
to pay (WTP) for conservation exceeds λ, the problem 
in question can be left to individual preferences. If 
WTP is smaller than λ, a collective policy is called for. 
At the 2001 Gothenburg Summit, the EU pledged 
to stop biodiversity loss until 2010. The extension of 
the deadline to 2020 indicates that EU countries are 
failing to warrant N*. In other words, they are failing 
to realize a central aspect of sustainability, which os-
tensibly guides their policies. Regardless of whether, 
in EU countries,  
(a)  individuals’ WTP is really too low, 
(b)  individuals’ genuine WTP is high  
 enough but spoiled by free riding,  
 or 
(c)  individuals’ WTP is high enough  
 but rests dormant due to inade- 
 quate institutions,  
society must act immediately to stop 
the ongoing loss of biodiversity. We 
need not wait until RANDALL’s (2007) 
framework of “green prices” for “green 
outputs” is completed although this 
completion is an important task for the 
future. In hypothetical societies of type 
(a) or (b), campaigning is required  
to convince people of the need for con-
servation and to dissuade them from 
free riding. Until this is done, conserva-
tion measures have to be implemented 
by state authority. 
MEYERHOFF et al. (2012) estimate 
the aggregate WTP for conservation of 
the German population to be several 
times higher than HAMPICKE’s (2013: 
115) calculation of the costs of a substantial conserva-
tion programme in the rural countryside of at most  
€ 2.109 per year. Thus, MEYERHOFF et al. (2012) re-
produce with strongly refined methodology the results 
of an early estimate by HAMPICKE et al. (1991). There 
is reason to believe that in Germany, case (c) prevails, 
corresponding to CIC I in Figure 1. Provided that this 
result can be corroborated by more research, it follows 
that, next to missing incentives for farmers, lack of 
suitable institutions which elicit, bundle and activate 
dormant willingness to contribute to conservation, is 
the major reason for poor conservation in the country-
side. 
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